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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision and judgment in favor 
of Plaintiffs/Respondents in a case that was heard before the 
Honorable Judge Omer Call in the First Judicial District in Box 
Elder County on November 9, 1984. This was an action brought by 
the Plaintiffs to foreclose a contract for the sale of real 
property and the financing thereof by the Plaintiffs to the 
Defendants/Appellants, the Smedley Family Investment Company with 
Dale Smedley, its general partner. 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The Court held that the Defendant had defaulted in its 
payments under the contract and as a result the Plaintiffs could 
treat the contract as a note and mortgage with the unpaid balance 
due and payable. The court issued a decree of foreclosure and 
ordered the subject property to be sold at public auction. The 
court also awarded Plaintiffs attorney's fees and legal costs. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Appellants have carried their burden of 
proof rebutting the presumption that the trial court's decision 
is valid and correct and that the trial court has not clearly 
abused its discretion in its decision that the contract was not 
ambiguous. 
2. (a) Whether the Appellants have waived an affirmative 
defense which they did not raise in the pleadings or at the trial 
court level and are raising for the first time on appeal. 
(b) Whether the Respondents fulfilled all necessary 
prerequisites to foreclosure under the circumstances. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 15, 1981, the Plaintiffs/Respondents entered into a 
contract to sell the Defendants/Appellants certain real property 
located in Box Elder County and to finance the sale by permitting 
the Defendants/Appellants to pay out the purchase price in in-
stallments over a seven-year period. (A copy of the contract 
appears in the record.) 
The contract provided that the Appellant/Buyer would pay 
$1.00 down, assume an obligation of the Plaintiffs/Respondents in 
the aggregate amount of $99,976.09, with the $380,022.01 balance 
of the purchase price plus interest accruing thereon to be paid 
in monthly installments. The contract gave the Appellant/Buyer 
the opportunity to make these payments out of the sale of certain 
additional real property being developed by the Appellant/Buyer. 
If the developed property did not sell, the Appellant/Buyer was 
nonetheless committed to complete payment on the balance by 
making the installment payments over a seven-year period, 
commencing on May 15, 1983 and ending on May 15, 1988. (See 
Section I.e. of the contract and R. 165-166.) 
Beginning on September 15, 1983, Appellant/Buyer failed to 
make its monthly installment payments as required under the 
contract. Respondents/Sellers gave written notice of default in 
accordance with the contract provisions and advised Appellants 
that under the acceleration clause of the contract, the entire 
unpaid balance was immediately due and payable, and that unless 
the sum was paid the contract would be treated as a note and 
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mortgage and an action to foreclose would be commenced as 
provided in Section XI.C of the contract. 
Respondents brought a foreclosure action and recorded a 
Notice of Lis Pendens and a copy of the contract in the Box Elder 
County land records. Trial was held on November 9, 1984 before 
the Honorable Judge Omer Call who found for the 
Plaintiffs/Respondents. (See R. 164-175.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial court, after hearing and considering the evidence, 
determined that Section I.e. of the agreement was unambiguous and 
clearly reflected the intentions of the parties. The rule of 
judicial review of a decision on appeal requires that the 
appellant (1) rebut the presumption that the findings and 
judgment of the trial court are valid and correct, (2) show that 
such findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence, and 
(3) prove such a serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. The Appellants in this case have not carried their 
burden of proof and therefore the findings and judgment of the 
trial court should not be disturbed. 
The Appellants raise in Point II of their argument an 
affirmative defense that was required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to be raised in the pleadings or by motion in the trial 
court, and if not raised at that time, to be waived. Matters 
neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial 
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. The failure 
of the Appellants to raise this affirmative defense below serves 
as a waiver by the Appellants to raise it on appeal. 
In any event, the affirmative defense the Appellants raise 
in their Point II regarding the passing of title to 
Appellant/Buyer prior to instituting the foreclosure action is a 
technicality that should not be used to unjustly enrich the 
Appellants at the expense of the Respondents who have not 
received the purchase price for the property they contracted to 
sell. If the Respondents had transferred title to 
Appellant/Buyer, such transfer would have jeopardized the 
Respondents valid interest in the property. The Utah Supreme 
Court has followed the general rule that tender of a deed before 
suit is not a condition precedent to a foreclosure action even if 
it is technically required by the contract. In addition, if the 
Appellants had properly raised this issue at the trial court 
level, the Respondents would have introduced evidence to prove 
that the Respondents, before commencing the foreclosure action, 
caused the contract to be recorded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NOT CARRIED THEIR BURDEN OF REBUTTING THE 
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND HAVE 
NOT SHOWN SUCH A SERIOUS INEQUITY AS TO MANIFEST A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT; THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THEREFORE 
BE UPHELD IN ITS FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS. 
The scope of appellate review is largely influenced by 
certain presumptions, pre-eminent among which is that which 
assumes the correctness of the decision appealed from the 
regularity of the proceedings below. 
Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944). The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that it is their duty to follow the cardinal 
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rules of judicial review, which the Court has defined as: to 
indulge the findings and judgment of the trial court a 
presumption of validity and correctness; to require the appellant 
to sustain the burden of showing error; to review the record in 
the light most favorable to those findings; not to disturb them 
if they find substantial support in the evidence. 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981); 
Charleton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176 (Utah 1961). 
The Appellant has the burden of proving that such a serious 
inequity has taken place on the trial court level as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion and that the trial court findings are 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. Searle v. Searle, 
522 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1974); Elton v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 503 P.2d 137, 137 (Utah 1972). On appeal, the 
burden is upon the appellant to convince the Supreme Court that 
the trial court committed error and not that the appellant should 
have won the case. Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Assoc, 470 
P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970) 
The trial court in this case, after hearing and considering 
the evidence, determined that Section I.e. of the agreement was 
unambiguous and clearly reflected the intentions of the parties. 
In their argument the Appellants do not even address the 
question of whether the trial court abused its discretion. The 
Appellants merely cite rules of contract interpretation which are 
not enough to overcome the well-settled presumption in favor of 
the trial court's reading of the evidence. In fact, a simple 
reading of Section I.e. of the contract reveals that there is no 
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ambiguity in the terms of payment of the purchase price agreed to 
by the Appellant/Buyer. As Judge Call stated in his decision on 
this issue, 
these people agreed that for two years there wouldn't 
be any monthly payments required, even though interest 
would be accruing ... they were ... saying if the sale 
of the lots that Mr. Smedley owned or controlled, as 
that was sold, could be applied to this contract. And 
if they paid it all out, they paid it all out. But if 
they didn't, then beginning in May of 1983 there was a 
monthly payment due. And it would continue to be due 
if the ... sales of Mr. Smedley "s lots didn't yield 
enough to pay them, then the monthly payments came due 
...[If] the ground that you say you will sell ... sells 
fast enough to pay me, fine, I will accept that. But 
if it doesn't, then two years hence I have got to start 
receiving [payments] per month on the purchase price... 
Transcript, pp. 165-166. 
The Appellants have not carried their burden of proving that 
Judge Call abused his discretion or committed substantial and 
prejudicial error that deprived the Appellants of a full and fair 
presentation of their case. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d L370, 1374 (Utah 1974). 
Nor have the Appellants proved that the finding was against the 
weight of the evidence. In the absence of such proof, the 
findings and judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed. 
POINT II. 
A. APPELLANTS FAILED TO RAISE IN THEIR ANSWER OR PUT IN ISSUE 
AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE THEY ARE NOW 
RAISING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL; APPELLANTS HAVE THEREFORE 
WAIVED ANY SUCH DEFENSE UNDER THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
AND SUCH DEFENSE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
require defendants to present their affirmative defenses and 
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objections in their responsive pleadings or by motion in the 
trial court. If the defendant does not raise a defense at that 
time, he is deemed to have waived the defense. Because an 
affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of the 
plaintiff's prima facie case, such defenses must be pleaded and 
failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the defense pursuant to 
Rule 12(h). Pratt v. Board of Education of Uintah County School 
District, 569 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 
375 P.2d 456 (Utah 1962). 
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at 
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Bundy v. Century Equipment Company, Inc., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 
1984). The Utah Supreme Court explained the public policy 
supporting the Rules of Civil Procedure cited above, as follows: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must 
present his entire.case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he 
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and 
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of 
litigation. 
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970). 
It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the 
parties in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). As 
a result of the Appellants' failure to plead, and hence their 
waiver of the affirmative defense they are now attempting to 
raise, the Appellants in this case are estopped from raising it 
on appeal. 
B. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE NOW BEING RAISED ON APPEAL FOR THE 
FIRST TIME IN WHICH THE APPELLANTS ALLEGE THE TECHNICALITY THAT 
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO DEED THE PROPERTY TO APPELLANTS BEFORE 
FORECLOSING SHOULD IN ANY EVENT BE DECIDED IN FAVOR OF RESPON-
DENTS; EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE SHOWN THAT RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH 
ALL NECESSARY PREREQUISITES TO FORECLOSURE UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
The Appellants now belatedly raise the affirmative defense 
that the Respondents failed to transfer title to the 
Appellant/Buyer prior to the instituting the foreclosure action. 
Although the Appellants did not raise this issue in their answer 
as is required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and there-
fore have waived this defense, if they had timely raised it, this 
defense would have failed. 
If the Appellants had properly raised this issue at the 
trial court level, the Respondents would have presented evidence 
showing that the contract itself was recorded prior to the 
institution of the foreclosure action. This made the equitable 
rights of the Respondents/Sellers a matter of public record. 
Transfer of the deed itself, which in any case was being held in 
escrow, would have jeopardized the Respondents" valid interest in 
the property. 
Courts have held that tender of a deed before suit is not a 
condition precedent to a foreclosure action. 77 Am Jur 2d Vendor 
and Purchaser, Section 427. The Utah Supreme Court followed this 
general rule in a case also involving a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract clause with the same wording as the contract involved in 
this case. (See Section XI.C. of the contract.) Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, v. King, 453 P.2d 697 (Utah 1969) 
was an appeal from an action to foreclose a Uniform Real Estate 
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Contract as a mortgage. The Court upheld the assignment of the 
contract and allowed the assignees to foreclose and get a 
deficiency judgment despite the fact that the title was not 
passed to the buyer before the foreclosure. 
It has also been held that it is not necessary that the 
seller tender a deed conveying title before a foreclosure suit, 
since the buyer should not be permitted to hold the benefits of 
his contract and at the same time refuse to perform. Mclndoe v. 
Morman, 26 Wis. 588. So long as the seller is in a position to 
tender the buyer a deed bearing marketable title in accordance 
with the contract being sought to be foreclosed, he does not have 
to actually tender the deed. McLeod v. Hamilton, 254 Mich. 653, 
236 N.W. 912. 
The affirmative defense that the Appellants in this case 
belatedly raise is a technicality that should not be used to 
unjustly enrich the Appellants at the expense of the Respondents 
who have not received the purchase price for the property they 
contracted to sell. The Respondents/Sellers agreed to finance 
the sale to Appellant/Buyer at a very reasonable rate of 
interest, thus allowing Appellant/Buyer to purchase the property 
without turning to a bank or other financial institution. The 
Respondents should not now be penalized and the Appellants should 
not be unjustly enriched because of a technicality regarding 
which the courts have traditionally granted leeway. "A court in 
its wisdom may deem it proper and equitable to direct a judicial 
sale of the property involved." Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 373 P.2d 
559, 568 (Idaho 1962). 
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CONCLUSION 
The finding and judgment of the trial court that Section 
I.e. of the agreement was unambiguous and clearly reflected the 
intentions of the parties should be upheld. Appellants have not 
carried their burden of rebutting the presumption that the 
findings and judgment of the trial court are valid and correct, 
showing that such findings are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence, and proving such a serious inequity as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. 
The Appellants have not carried their burden of proof and 
therefore the findings and judgment of the trial court should not 
be disturbed. 
The affirmative defense raised by the Appellants was 
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to be raised in the 
pleadings or by motion in the trial court. Since the defense was 
not raised at that time, it has been waived. Matters neither 
raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 
In any event, the affirmative defense the Appellants 
belatedly raise regarding the passing of title to Appellant/Buyer 
prior to instituting the foreclosure action is a technicality 
that should not be used to unjustly enrich the Appellants at the 
expense of the Respondents. Such transfer would have jeopardized 
the Respondents' valid interest in the property. The Utah 
Supreme Court has followed the general rule that tender of a deed 
before suit is not a condition precedent to a foreclosure action 
even if it is technically required by the contract. Appel-
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lant/Buyer should not be permitted to hold the benefits of its 
contract and at the same time refuse to perform. 
The Respondents respectfully submit that the trial court's 
decision granting foreclosure should be affirmed. 
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